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ABSTRACTS
ABSTRACTS
Divorce-Sale of Property by Court Order
The circuit court, having granted a divorce sought by wife, W,
directed the sale of W's property at public sale under the authority
of W. VA. CODE ch. 48, art. 2, § 13, 19 (Michie 1966). W
instituted this prohibition proceeding contending that the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction to order the sale even with the consent,
approval, and agreement of both parties to the divorce. Held, writ
awarded. The circuit court lacked jurisdiction to direct the sale and
order the proceeds divided between H and W, even if their consent
had been given. Collins v. Muntzing, 157 S.E.2d 16 (W. Va. 1967).
The court, relying on its decisions in Hammond v. Worrell, 144
W. Va. 83, 106 S.E.2d 521 (1958) and Farley v. Farley, 149 W. Va.
352, 141 S.E.2d 63 (1965), held inapplicable W. VA. CODE ch. 48,
art. 2, § 15 (Michie 1966) which gives the court the power to make
an order concerning the estate of the parties or either of them in
cases relating to the maintainance of the parties and or custody of
their children. The court also held inapplicable W. VA. CODE ch. 48,
art. 2, § 19 (Michie 1966) which relates to the power of the court
to require one party to a divorce proceeding to convey real estate to
the other. The court did, however, indicate that the authority granted
under W. VA. CODE ch. 48, art. 2, § 19 (Michie 1966) coupled with
a written agreement between the husband and wife could bring
about a different result than that in the principal case. Farley v.
Farley, 149 W. Va. 352, 359, 141 S.E.2d 63, 68 (1965).
Estate Tax-Ascertainable Standard Exception to
General Power of Appointment Inclusion
H received property from his deceased wife under the terms of a
mutual will giving him the property for life with the power to "use,
utilize, and dispose of the same," with the remainder over to their
seven children. Upon H's death, his executor argues that this power
is limited by an ascertainable standard and is therefore a special
power under § 2041 of the Internal Revenue Code. As such the
property subject to the power should be excluded from H's estate
for federal estate tax purposes. Executor contends that W. VA. CODE
ch. 36, art. 1, § 16 (Michie 1966) effectively limited H's power of
appointment to an ascertainable standard. This action was brought
for refund of estate tax. Held, complaint dismissed. H had a general
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power over the property which was not subject to an ascertainable
standard and, therefore, the property subject to the power was
included in H's gross estate in computing the federal estate tax. The
court further held that although W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1, § 36
(Michie 1966) limits the exercise of such powers to lawful exercise,
such a limitation is not sufficient to be termed an ascertainable
standard and thereby gain the favored exclusionary treatment under
the federal estate tax. Potter v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 545
(N. D. W. Va. 1967).
The granting of a life estate with a power of disposition over the
remainder no longer creates a fee simple in West Virginia. W. VA.
CODE ch. 36, art. 1, § 36 (Michie 1966). But even so, the estate
planner should limit a power of appointment for the benefit of the
life tenant to an ascertainable standard if he wants to keep the value
of the property subject to the power from being included in the life
tenant's gross estate for estate tax purposes. Treas. Reg. 20.2041-
1(c)(2) (1958) as amended T.D. 6582, 1962 Cum. Bull. 177.
Evidence--Circumstantial Evidence in a Homocide Prosecution
D was indicted for murder of her lover's wife and, on the same
indictment, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Testimony
placed D at the scene of the crime at the proper time and with a
motive; however, no homicide weapon was produced. Testimony
of deceased's husband, the lover, was that D usually carried a gun.
The only weapon introduced into evidence, said by the lover to have
been in his wife's possession at the time of the shooting was found
where the lover had hidden it. No ballistics tests were made to
determine if the death bullet was fired from this gun. Held, affirmed.
Positive evidence of D having a gun in her possession is not essential.
The jury determines the truth of testimony and a reversal is prevented
here because the evidence connecting the defendant with the com-
mission of the crime was sufficient to warrant its submission to the
jury. State v. Bailey, 155 S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 1967).
This case attracts immediate attention, upon first reading, due to
the failure to positively connect the defendant with a homicide
weapon. However, research reveals no case in which the actual pro-
duction of a homicide weapon is an essential element of a homicide
offense. As stated by the court, circumstantial evidence can be
used to convict one of a crime with the jury determining the weight
[Vol. 70
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 2 [1968], Art. 22
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol70/iss2/22
